Using data from 319 microfinance institutions (MFIs) in 68 developing countries, we study the degree to which international debt investments are related to the financial and social performances of MFIs. We find that commercial investments are mainly related to financial performance and level of professionalisation of the MFIs. The targeting of women is not a priority, even though international commercial investors target MFIs that provide small loans. Subsidised investments, however, are mainly driven by the targeting of women, while financial performance and the level of professionalisation of the MFI is not a priority. 
Introduction
During the last decades, microfinance, the provision of banking services to poor families and micro-entrepreneurs, has evolved to become a global industry. Until recently, donations and subsidised loans have been the main source of funding for microfinance institutions (MFIs).
Lately, however, the growth of the industry and the pressure by donors toward financial sustainability have motivated MFIs to turn to international capital markets. Moreover, international funding is regarded by many to be essential to fuel the growth of the sector, arguing that only international capital markets can handle the estimated US$200 billion needed to reach the potential demand for microfinance services worldwide (Swanson, 2008) .
Recent academic research (Mersland et al., 2011) has also shown that internationalisation, notable through investments, can have an overall positive influence on the social performance of MFIs. This is particularly interesting considering microfinance pertains to the field of social entrepreneurship, where balancing both economic and social outcomes is a constant challenge (Zahra et al., 2009) .
The funding of the microfinance industry has rapidly become a new specialised market. The development of specialised investment funds, called microfinance investment vehicles Those investing in MIVs are attracted by both social and financial returns (Reille et al., 2011) .
This paper examines whether MIVs' investments matches the expectations of the investors by identifying which MFIs are being targeted by international funding. More specifically, using data from 319 MFIs in 68 developing countries, we study whether there is a relationship between an MFI's access to international commercial and subsidised debt and its financial and social performance. We find that access to commercial debt is related strong financial performance, a high level of professionalisation and a low average loan indicating outreach to poor customers. The targeting of women is not a priority for MFIs accessing international commercial debt. As for those MFIs accessing subsidised international debt they target female customers to a greater extent than other MFIs.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses how the financial and social performances of MFIs influence the type of funding received, and it outlines the hypotheses to be tested. Section 3 explains the model, the methodology and the dataset used for estimations while Section 4 presents and discusses the findings. Section 5 concludes.
International funding and the performance of MFIs
In this section we develop hypotheses on how international funding is associated with the financial and social performances of MFIs.
The relationship between international funding and MFI performance
As all MIVs claim to offer social returns to investors, they belong to the field of socially responsible investments (SRIs). Indeed, an SRI is "an investment process that integrates social, environmental and ethical considerations into investment decision making" (Renneboog el al., 2008) . SRIs are strongly related to the corporate social responsibility (CSR) of the firms in which they are invested. CSR is based on the idea that firms have ethical obligations and must respond appropriately to pressures from society (Carroll, 1979) .
Initially, CSR was limited to corporate philanthropy (Cochran, 2007) . The concept then evolved into the idea that real social responsibility is not just donating money to charities, but involves investing in projects that yield social and economic benefits (Porter and Kramer, 2002 ).
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The screening criteria for SRI funds depend on the selected approach between negative screening and positive screening (Renneboog et al., 2008; Juravle and Lewis, 2008; Bollen, 2007) . Negative screening involves a two step process. First, the investment horizon is defined by excluding specific fields or activities that investors consider "undesirable" (for instance, firms involved in weapons, alcohol or tobacco). Then, investments are selected by a financial risk/return analysis. The alternative approach, positive screening, does not exclude any field ex ante but selects investments because they meet higher performance levels in the desired criteria (e.g., high environmental or social performance).
If the MIVs use a positive screening approach, we would expect to find a positive relationship between access to international funding and social performance in the MFI. However, if the MIVs use a negative screening approach, that is, they screen out all none microfinance investments and consider microfinance a social investment per se, we would then not expect to find any statistical relationship between access to international funding and the social results of the MFI but, rather, a positive relationship with financial performance.
Based on the above, we propose the following general hypothesis posed in the alternative form:
In the case of positive screening,
H1a: The presence of international funding in an MFI is positively related to its social performance
In the case of negative screening,
H1b: There is no relationship between the presence of international funding in an MFI and its social performance
To propose hypotheses on the relationship between the access to international investments and the MFI's financial performance, we must understand that these investments can be split into two categories, namely, commercial funding and subsidised funding. Indeed, in his pioneer study on MIVs, Goodman (2004) when the MFI has to pay interest at the market rate, and the loan is labelled "subsidised" if the interest rate is below the market conditions (also referred to as a concessional loan).
Therefore, we need to distinguish commercial from subsidised loans to understand their respective relationship with the social and financial performance of the MFI.
Commercial funding and MFI performance
We expect that international commercial investors invest in financially well-performing MFIs.
Indeed, along with the growth of cross-border investments in microfinance, the sector has witnessed the increasing participation of commercial investors seeking market returns.
Microfinance, at its best, has proven that it can generate profit and growth while being low risk (Swanson, 2008) . MFIs can also be meaningful instruments for portfolio diversification.
According to a study of MIV portfolios by Oehri & Fausch (2008) , microfinance investments show low volatility and low correlation to other asset classes, which potentially makes microfinance an interesting asset to include in a portfolio for commercial investors.
Building on business life-cycle theory, which states that the development of organisations depends on their capacity to access adapted funding sources (Little, 1974; Channon, 2006) , several authors (Kooi, 2001; de Sousa-Shields & Frankiewicz, 2004; Van Maanen, 2005; Bogan, 2008) 
H3b: The presence of international subsidised funding in an MFI is positively related to its financial performance
We now set up a model that links a set of variables composed of financial and social performance indicators to the type of international funding received by MFIs.
Definitions of the variables
To proxy the MFI's financial performance, we use the return on assets (ROA), the operating expense ratio, and the 30-day portfolio-at-risk (SEEP Network, 2005) .
The ROA indicates how well the MFI is able to generate profit from its assets and is The average loan size (weighted by GNI per capita) (e.g., Lensink et al., 2011; Mersland and Strøm, 2010; Cull et al., 2007; De Bruyne, 2008) . According to Schreiner (2002) , a lower loan size indicates that the MFI reaches out to poorer customers. To ensure comparability between countries, we take the average loan size as a percentage of per capita gross national income (GNI).
The targeting of women (e.g., De Bruyne, 2008 , D'Espallier et al., 2011 Armendariz and Morduch, 2010; Mersland and Strøm, 2010) . We use a time-invariant dummy that indicates whether the MFI has a conscious bias toward lending to women as indicated in the rating
The rural outreach (De Bruyne, 2008, Mersland and Strøm, 2010) . We use a dummy variable defining whether the MFI serves rural markets. As rural areas are generally in financial need and more difficult for MFIs to penetrate, better rural outreach can be considered an indicator of higher social performance.
We also include a number of control variables that could influence whether an international MIV would lend to an MFI. First, we include institution-specific controls that could potentially influence the access to international funding: size (logarithm of MFI assets); age (number of years since start-up of MFI); a dummy stating whether the MFI was originated by an international initiator, as Mersland et al. (2011) show international orientation can have an impact on social performance of MFIs; a dummy indicating whether the MFI mobilise voluntary savings; and the level of professionalisation proxied by a dummy for the presence of an internal auditor reporting to the board. We then include context variables: the human development index to control for development differences across countries and regional dummies to capture differences across regions (Latin America, MENA region, EECA region, Asia and Africa).
The model 9
To investigate to which type of MFI the international funding is being channelled, we use a pooled cross-section probit estimation method (further explained in section 3). We estimate three regressions. In one regression, the dependent variable is a dummy stating whether the MFI holds international debt at all, and in the other two, the dependent variable distinguishes whether the MFI has international commercial debt or subsidised debt.
International investments
dmWomen + β 6 dmrural + β 7 Size + β 8 Age + β 9 dmIntInit + β 10 dmSavings + β 11 dmaudit + β 12
where Φ is the cumulative normal distribution.
Commercial funding
Pr(International commercial debt = 1) = Φ (β 0 + same variables)
Subsidised funding
Pr(International subsidised debt = 1) = Φ (β 0 + same variables)
Data and estimation methodology

Dataset and descriptive statistics
The dataset comprises up to five years of data from 319 MFIs in 68 developing countries. The information has been compiled from risk assessment reports prepared by five rating agencies specialising in microfinance: MicroRate, Microfinanza, Planet Rating, Crisil and M-Cril.
Comparisons of the methodologies applied by the rating agencies reveal no major differences in MFI assessment relevant for variables included in this study. The dataset has a certain sample selection bias as only rated MFIs are included. They represent international oriented
MFIs with the intention to practice microfinance in a business-oriented manner, and they have the greatest likelihood of achieving the dual goal of social and financial performance.
The rating agencies differ in their emphasis and in the abundance of available information.
Thus, different number of observations on different variables in different years is reported.
The rating reports comprising the data used for this study 
Estimation methods
To determine which type of performance is associated with MFIs receiving international investments, we estimate two pooled probit regressions (Stock & Watson, 2006) . This type of model allows us to observe the effect of a change in the explicative variables on the dependant variable expressed in terms of probability. In probit regressions, the coefficients of As the data have a panel structure but the two dependent variables (commercial debt and subsidised debt) were reported only for the last year in the rating reports, we assume them to be constant over time. This assumption is natural as MFIs tend to keep international debt once received. In addition, the assumption corresponds to the reality behind investments as investors include historical performance when making their funding decisions. Therefore, we run cross-section pooled regressions. In all regressions, we use robust standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity. Data have also been tested and treated for outliers using Grubbs' test (Iglewicz and Hoaglin, 1993) . Finally, we run regressions with and without the regional control variables.
Empirical results
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Univariate statistics
As a starting point, we compare the different groups of MFIs according to the type of international debt they have. We split our sample into three groups 5 : MFIs without any international debt, MFIs with international commercial debt only, and MFIs with international subsidised debt only. We first want to know if there is any difference in performance among these groups. For this, we use a one-way ANOVA analysis. We test the significance of variance differences among our three groups, regarding each financial and social performance variable.
Our null hypothesis is:
H 0 : There is no difference among the performances of the three groups of MFIs.
Our alternative hypothesis is:
H a : There is a difference among the performances of the three groups of MFIs.
<Table 3 about there>
The outcome of the one-way ANOVA is presented in Table 3 . The significant F statistic shows that for the variables ROA, PAR30, Women bias and Rural market, there is a significant difference in performance among the three groups. However, the ANOVA does not show where the differences are. To determine this, we run mean comparison tests pairwise between the three groups. In sum, the mean comparison tests show that commercial funding targets the more professional, financially well-performing and less socially performing MFIs, while the opposite is the case for subsidised debt. In the next sub-section we use a probit estimation method to see whether our findings hold in a multivariate setting. debt. An international initiator is, indeed, more likely to provide the necessary contacts to the MFIs for access to international funding (Mersland et al., 2011) , while higher loan sizes can lead to a more cost-efficient structure (Lensink et al., 2011) , which can also attract international funders. However, these general results do not tell much about the relationship between the type of funding received and the performance of the MFI (H1a and H1b) as the effects could be very different from one type of funding to another. We therefore disentangle the international debt variable into two distinct variables: international commercial debt only, and international subsidised debt only 6 . Table 6 shows the regressions for international commercial debt.
Linking MFI performance and access to international funding
<Table 6 about there> Beginning with the relationship between access to commercial debt and financial performance (H2), our expectations are supported. Indeed, a higher ROA, lower operating expense ratio and lower PAR30 significantly increase the likelihood for an MFI to have international commercial debt. This finding is consistent with the notion that commercial investors target more robust and profitable MFIs (Bogan, 2008; Goodman, 2004) . This also confirms the observation made by many that MIVs target the "niche" of financially profitable MFIs (De Schrevel et al., 2009; Wiesner and Quien, 2010) .
Regarding social performance, lower average loan sizes increase the likelihood of commercial debt for the MFI. Indeed, all microfinance funders declare that social performance matters.
The average loan size is the most used and one of the easiest social indicators to gather about an MFI (Urgeghe, 2010). We find a significant negative relationship between the presence of commercial funding and the targeting of women by the MFI. Thus, commercial MIVs care about reaching the poor but do not consider reaching women a priority.
Control variables show that having an internal auditor reporting to the Board significantly increases the likelihood of accessing commercial funding, which is in line with the lifecycle theory and the expectations of professional investors regarding investees' institutional stability. Table 7 shows the regressions for international subsidised debt. In sum, this analysis suggests that even if the international funding to MFIs comes from socially responsible investors, we need to distinguish between commercial and subsidised funding to understand MIVs practices. Commercial funding seems to be clearly driven by financial performance and the level of professionalisation of the MFI, while the targeting of women is clearly not a priority, even though they target institutions that provide smaller loans to their clients. This seems to match the negative screening approach -microfinance is per se considered a social investment so MIVs offering commercial debt can concentrate on analysing the level of professionalization and financial performance of the MFI. On the other hand, subsidised funding seems to clearly target institutions focusing on women without prioritising level of professionalization or financial performance. Thus, subsidised providers of debt seem to follow a positive approach but mainly limited to the targeting of women.
Conclusion
Starting with the statement that international funders of microfinance claim to pursue both financial and social bottom lines through their investments, this paper tests what type of characteristics and performance in an MFI actually attracts international investments, segmented into commercial and subsidised debt. The overall conclusion is that commercial funding seems to match the negative screening approach as it is mainly driven by financial performance and the level of professionalisation of the MFIs, while subsidised funding is mainly driven by the targeting of women and not by the level of professionalization or financial performance of the MFI. Thus, subsidised loan providers seem to follow a positive approach in their investments.
By applying financial criteria to select MFIs, commercial funding seems to consider those institutions, per se, part of the social investment horizon. As a result, any MFI that can demonstrate a good level of professionalisation and a good financial return is likely to attract international commercial investments. The results also indicate that operational efficiency, such as a lower operating expense ratio and a lower portfolio at risk matter for commercial
investors. Again, this shows that commercial microfinance investors consider the level of professionalization to be important as operating efficiency measures the degree to which the MFI masters its processes (Mersland and Strøm, 2010) .
Two important policy implications can be drawn from this paper. A robustness check (unreported) has been conducted by running the same regressions using a logit model, yielding almost exactly the same results with similar pseudo-R 2 . A robustness check (unreported) has been conducted by running the same regressions using a logit model, yielding almost exactly the same results with similar pseudo-R 2 . 
Tables
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